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This is the first authoritative ruling on the definition of "next
of kin" since the above mentioned amendment became effective. The
result has been to check conflicting interpretations among the various
departments of the Appellate Division. 9

M
WILLS-DUPLICATE WILLS-RETENTION OF BOTH BY TESTATOR
DURING His LIFE.-Decedent executed her will in duplicate and re-

tained both copies. After her death, the ribbon copy was missing and
only the carbon copy offered for probate. The contestant argued
that, since all the executed copies were not produced, there arose a
presumption of revocation of the will. In reversing a decree denying probate, the Appellate Division held that, since both copies were
retained by the decedent, the discovery of one of them at her death
is sufficient to support a jury's finding of non-revocation. Matter
of Mittelstaedt, 280 App. Div. 163, 112 N. Y. S. 2d 166 (1st Dep't
1952).
When a single will has been executed and it is established that
it was not within the testator's possession or control prior to his
death, no presumption of revocation arises in the event that the will
is missing.' Any such presumption would be entirely overcome by
the inaccessibility of the instrument to the testator and the consequent improbability of his having destroyed it.2 However, when a
single will is last traced to the testator and, upon his death, cannot
be found, there arises the presumption that he destroyed it animo
revocandi.3 The disappearance is presumed intentional, in the latter
case, because of the ambulatory
character of the will, coupled with
4
its availability to the testator.
The presumption of revocation, in such circumstances, may be
rebutted by proof that the will was "....

in existence at the time of

the testator's death, or was fraudulently destroyed in his lifetime .

. . ."

5

The burden of such proof is on the proponent.0

.

It

19 A recent amendment substituted "persons interested in the estate" for
"next of kin." Laws of N. Y. 1952, c. 350, § 133 (effective Sept. 1, 1952). By
definition, "next of kin" are included among "persons interested in the estate."
N. Y. SURR. CT. Acr § 314(10).
1 Schultz v. Schultz, 35 N. Y. 653 (1866).
2 See id. at 654.
3 Matter of Staiger, 243 N. Y. 468, 154 N. E. 312, reversing 217 App.
Div. 743, 216 N. Y. Supp. 920 (1st Dep't 1926); Matter of Kennedy, 167 N. Y.
163, 60 N. E. 442 (1901), affirming 53 App. Div. 105, 65 N. Y. Supp. 879
(1st Dep't 1900); Collyer v. Collyer, 110 N. Y. 481, 18 N. E. 110 (1888);
accord, Matter of Cunnion, 201 N. Y. 123, 94 N. E. 648 (1911).
4 See Matter of Kennedy, sufta note 3 at 168, 60 N. E. at 443; Betts v.
Jackson, 6 Wend. 173, 181 (N. Y. 1830).
5 N. Y. SuRR. CT. AcT § 143.
6 Matter of Staiger, 243 N. Y. 468, 154 N. E. 312, reversing 217 App.
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has been held that no malice or dishonesty is necessary to constitute
fraud within the meaning of this statutory provision. It is sufficient
if the will was destroyed without the knowledge or consent of the
testator, contrary to his testamentary intentions,7 thus including accidental destruction.8 Further, it has been intimated that destruction
either by the testator or by another with his knowledge and consent
will not revoke the will if it is established that the act was done for
some purpose other than revocation. 9
It is the belief of many lawyers that by executing wills in duplicate they are protecting their client against intestacy. If one will is
lost or destroyed, it is thought that the other will be admitted to
probate; but present New York law actually increases the danger of
intestacy under such circumstances.' 0 The result has been much confusion and litigation.
When there are duplicate wills, one copy remaining with the
testator and the other in the possession of a third party, and the one
not in the testator's possession is the only one missing, the presumption of revocation is overcome," for the same reason as in the12case
It
of a single will in another's possession; i.e., non-accessibility.
follows from this rule that, when a third party has possession of both
duplicates and one or both are missing, the presumption will likewise
be overcome. Accordingly, when the only copy in the testator's possession cannot be found, the presumption arises that he destroyed it
intending revocation, and the other copy will not be admitted to
probate.' 3 In this instance, a revocation of one copy is a revocation
of the entire testament since the testator, having only one copy, could
not readily have destroyed both.
A more delicate situation occurs where a will has been executed
in duplicate and the testator has retained both copies, only one of

Div. 743, 216 N. Y. Supp. 920 (lst Dep't 1926).
7 Matter of Dorrity, 118 Misc. 725, 194 N. Y. Supp. 573 (Surr. Ct. 1922).
8 Matter of Breckwoldt, 170 Misc. 883, 11 N. Y. S. 2d 486 (Surr. Ct.
1939).
9Matter of Thompson, 191 Misc. 109, 76 N. Y. S. 2d 742 (Surr. Ct.
1948).
0
1 See Matter of Robinson, 257 App. Div. 405, 13 N. Y. S. 2d 324 (4th
Dep't 1939). "But, under the decisions of 'the courts of this State, one who
makes a will in duplicate subjects it to a double hazard of loss or accidental
-destruction which cannot be accounted for.. .. " Id. at 406, 13 N. Y. S. 2d
at 326.
II Matter of Sands, 194 Misc. 662, 89 N. Y. S. 2d 541 (Surr. Ct. 1949);
Matter of Cucci, 192 Misc. 554, 81 N. Y. S. 2d 202 (Surr. Ct. 1948).
12 See note 2 supra.
13 Matter of Robinson, 257 App. Div. 405, 13 N. Y. S. 2d 324 (4th Dep't
1939) ; Matter of Betts, 200 Misc. 633, 107 N. Y. S. 2d 626 (Surr. Ct. 1951) ;
Matter of Breding, 161 Misc. 322, 291 N. Y. Supp. 750 (Surr. Ct. 1936), aff'd,
251 App. Div. 737, 297 N. Y. Supp. 681 (2d Dep't 1937); Matter of McChesney, 118 Misc. 545, 194 N. Y. Supp. 893 (Surr. Ct. 1922) ; see Note, 48 A. L. R.
297 (1927).
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which can be found upon his death. In Pemberton v. Pemberton,1 4
where the testator had possession of duplicate wills at death, one of
which had been altered and cancelled rather than lost, the court held
that the unaltered copy could be probated. In Matter of Shields,15
wherein one of the two copies retained by the testator was lost, the
New York Surrogate's Court, in admitting the available copy to probate, followed the reasoning of the Pemberton case to the effect that
the presumption of revocation was of the weakest character and decided that it was overcome by the preservation of the duplicate copy.
Later, however, the same court, in Matter of Blackstone,16 refused
to follow the Shields case, believing it to be against the weight of
controlling authority.17 Instead, it applied the presumption in all its
rigor, denying probate of the copy found in possession of the deceased.
The primary effect of the instant case, Matter of Mittelstaedt,
is to remove such situations as the latter from a strict application of
the presumption of revocation. The court emphasizes that the presumption arising from the mere failure to produce an original counterpart is only an inference of fact which may be rebutted by circumstantial evidence' 8
Since the testator had possession of both copies, it seems improbable that, had he intended revocation, he would have destroyed
only one of them leaving the other to be discovered after his death.
The instant decision, therefore, is logical, in accord with the factual
probabilities of the situation, and not, as was thought in Matter of
Blackstone, opposed to the weight of authority. 19 The court agreed
with the Shields case, though not mentioning it, that the basis for
the presumption upon such facts is, at best, a weak one 2--so weak,
indeed, as to be rebuttable by a single fact: the testator's possession
of one copy at his death.
13 Ves. 290, 33 Eng. Rep. 303 (Ch. 1807).
117 Misc. 96, 190 N. Y. Supp. 562 (Surr. Ct. 1921).
16 172 Misc. 479, 15 N. Y. S. 2d 597 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
27 Ibid. Of the cases there cited as forming that authority, however, none
14
'5

contained facts identical to the case at bar. Instead, they were cases in which
the missing copy was the only one traced to the testator's possession. The
presumption was therefore properly applied.
Is "Under the circumstances disclosed by this record, we think that any
presumption of destruction of the decedent's will animo revocandi arising from
mere failure to produce an original counterpart was a mere inference of fact.
... A presumption of intentional revocation may be overcome by circumstantial evidence." Matter of Mittelstaedt, 278 App. Div. 231, 232, 104 N. Y. S.
2d 378, 379 (1st Dep't 1951) (principal case on first appeal quoted by court
in instant
case).
19
See note 17 supra.
20See Pemberton v. Pemberton, 13 Ves. 290, 33 Eng. Rep. 303, 310 (Ch.
1807); Matter of Shields, 117 Misc. 96, 97, 190 N. Y. Supp. 562, 563 (Surr.
Ct. 1921); Matter of Schofield, 72 Misc. 281, 285, 129 N. Y. Supp. 190, 193
(Surf. Ct. 1911) : "The presumption of revocation in such a case is, of course,
a weak one, for the testator, when possessed of both examples, is at liberty
to destroy them, and yet he does not do so." (Situation referred to here was
similar to the facts of instant case).

